If pleaded successfully, the partial defence of diminished responsibility allows the defendant to be found guilty only of manslaughter, as opposed to murder. Although the defence has been amended by s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, only murders committed on or after 4 October 2010 fall within the ambit of the amended defence. Therefore, the applicable law in the present case was s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957, prior to its amendment. There are three elements to this defence that must be satisfied for it to apply. Section 2(2), which has not been amended by the 2009 Act, places a legal burden on the defendant to satisfy these elements: that he was suffering from an abnormality of mind at the time of the killing; that abnormality arose from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes, or was induced by disease or injury; and his mental responsibility for the acts constituting the offence was substantially impaired by the abnormality.
At trial there was consensus that Foye's personality disorder came within the expression 'abnormality of mind'. The issue centred on whether the personality disorder, or any other 'specified cause', 'substantially impaired' Foye's mental responsibility for killing Coello. The *J. Crim. L. 361 Crown contended that it did not, and pointed to evidence that Foye was in control, and planned the attack. The defence countered the Crown's suggestion that Foye targeted Coello because he was a sex offender by arguing that Foye killed Coello as he was unable to resist homicidal thoughts. Foye was convicted of murder. He appealed against conviction on the ground, inter alia, that the reverse burden of proof imposed by s. 2(2) of the 1957 Act is incompatible with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEAL , it was self-evident that s. 2(2) does not contravene Article 6(2). The better view is that s. 2(2) does not impinge upon the presumption of innocence because it requires a defendant to establish an exception or excuse, rather than disprove an element of the offence. Alternatively, if s. 2(2) does impact upon the presumption, it is a justified modification of it, due to the practical difficulties that would be involved for the prosecution in ascertaining the inner workings of a defendant's mind. If the provision imposed merely an evidential burden on the defendant, it might be impossible for the Crown to disprove, beyond reasonable doubt, an assertion that the defendant was suffering from diminished responsibility. Finally, the court held that the imposition of a reverse burden of proof for defendants pleading diminished responsibility is consistent with jurisprudence from Strasbourg, Canada, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
COMMENTARY
Section 2(2) of the 1957 Act states: 'it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder'. The provision is an express statutory exception to the 'Golden Thread'; the general rule is that the prosecution bears the legal burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond reasonable doubt (Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481, per Lord Sankey). This presumption of innocence is enshrined within Article 6(2), which states: 'Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law'.
An evidential burden is placed on the defendant if he raises a defence (for example, self-defence). All that needs to be adduced by the party bearing the evidential burden to discharge it is 'some piece of evidence ' (at [36] ) on the relevant issue. Once the issue is raised by some evidence, the Crown bears the burden of disproving it beyond reasonable doubt. What some evidence equates to in terms of quality and quantity was considered in Don Jayasena (Rajapakse Pathurange) v The Queen [1970] AC 618, where Lord Devlin concluded that the evidential burden required the defendant to collect from the evidence enough material 'to make it possible for a reasonable jury to acquit' (Don Jayasena at Express statutory exceptions, such as s. 2(2), impose a legal burden on the defendant to establish a defence on the balance of probabilities. Thus, with regard to the defence of diminished responsibility, a burden is placed on the defendant to prove he was suffering from an abnormality of mind at the time of killing, which arose from a specified cause and substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the acts constituting the offence. Foye's counsel argued that this conflicts with the Golden Thread and Article 6(2).
The Human Rights Act 1998 provides judges with two potential options when faced with this problem of incompatibility of a statutory provision with Convention rights: (1) under s. 4 they can issue a declaration of incompatibility; or (2) under s. 3 they can 'read down' the section of the Act that is imposing a legal burden on the defendant as imposing merely an evidential burden. In Foye's appeal it was argued that the reverse burden imposed on the defendant, by virtue of s. 2(2), was incompatible with Article 6(2) and, therefore, should be read down. In dispensing with this argument, the court considered authorities from the English courts and abroad.
Justification for s. 2(2): untangling a knot of interrelated authorities
In the conjoined appeal of R v Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] QB 1112, Lord Woolf CJ took the opportunity to consider the impact of Article 6(2) on statutory provisions pursuant to which the defendant bears a burden of proof. Lambert concerned s. 28(3)(b)(i) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. It was held that, to establish a defence under s. 28(3)(b)(i), the defendant had to prove that he did not know the bag he was carrying contained a proscribed drug (thus, he carried a legal burden on this issue). Ali and Jordan were separate instances of diminished responsibility and thus concerned s. 2(2). The court addressed directly the argument that s. 2(2) contravened Article 6(2) and held that it was 'self-evident' it did not (Lambert, Ali and Jordan at [17] ).
The court certified that a point of law of general public importance was involved in all three appeals, thus opening up the possibility of a subsequent appeal to the House of Lords. Despite all three defendants applying for leave to appeal, their Lordships granted leave in Lambert only (R Foye's counsel argued that the court was free to depart from the decision in Ali and Jordan because the Court of Appeal in that case wrongly took into account deference to Parliament (at [21] ). This argument was not accepted. On the contrary, it was held that the reverse burden, pursuant to s. 2(2), is justified by a number of factors explained below. (1) if a defendant is successful in pleading diminished responsibility a mandatory sentence for murder is replaced by a discretionary sentence (for voluntary manslaughter) which is tailored to the circumstances of the individual; (2) the existence of diminished responsibility, and the application of the defence, depends upon the internal functioning of the defendant's mental processes. Therefore, according to the court, it would be impractical, and could potentially lead to an unfair trial, if the Crown were to bear the burden of disproving the defence (at [23] ). In many cases, it would be impossible for the Crown to disprove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the defendant was suffering from diminished responsibility, as it would have to adduce evidence of the absence of abnormality in the defendant's mental state. The defendant is not obliged to submit to a medical examination, and, if he does, he may not cooperate. Thus, in the court's judgment:
This is a simple but fundamental reason why the reverse onus is essential to the working of the law of diminished responsibility. (at [35])
In the court's opinion this impracticality could not be offset by reading down the provision, so as to impose an evidential burden, even if it were a hypothetical requirement that the issue of diminished responsibility is raised by some medical evidence. It would still be too easy for the defendant to discharge his burden, and, potentially, almost a practical impossibility for the Crown to discharge its burden in turn (at [36] ).
Secondly, the court relied upon the European Court of Human Rights case of Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379. Here, the court adopted a balancing process, stating: 'Presumptions of fact or law operate in every legal system. Clearly the Convention does not prohibit such presumptions as principle ' (Salabiaku at [28] ). Therefore, High Contracting Parties are entitled to legislate within reasonable limits regarding reverse burdens. However, any legislative interference with the presumption of innocence requires justification and must not be greater than is necessary, namely it must be proportionate. Ali and Jordan (ibid. at [14] ). In this case, a less-interventionist approach was adopted *J. Crim. L. 364 than that applied in Lambert. Their Lordships stressed the need for due respect to be paid to the will of Parliament, cautioning against any ready finding that the imposition of a reverse legal burden was disproportionate under the ECHR (and, obviously, in conflict with the Golden Thread). This decision was followed by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 2004) , a case that Lord Hughes, in the present case, thought supported the correctness of the decision in Ali and Jordan. The apparent conflict between the interventionist approach in Lambert, and the more passive approach employed in Johnstone, was dealt with in Sheldrake v DPP; Attorney General 's Reference (No. 4 of 2002) , where, once again, Salabiaku v France was applied. Their Lordships held that Lambert should not be disregarded. The decision was judged to be compatible with Johnstone, as the two decisions dealt with different types of cases, thus they were both valid authorities (Sheldrake at [30] ). The primary consideration for the court is the compatibility of the reverse legal burden with a fair trial. If it is incompatible, it should be read down as imposing an evidential burden. However, the imposition of a reverse legal burden does not necessarily preclude a fair trial.
Salabiaku v France was applied by the Court of Appeal in Lambert,
Employment of Salabiaku v France can be found in other legal systems and in cases involving insanity. In R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303 the Canadian Supreme Court considered the validity of legislation imposing a reverse legal burden on a defendant who has pleaded insanity. The court looked at whether the legislation contravened the presumption of innocence operating pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code. The court held by a majority of 6:3 that the reverse burden provision did impinge upon the presumption of innocence; but not so as to make it invalid under the Charter. In the majority's judgment, it satisfied the test of proportionality and served a legitimate objective that justified the circumvention of a constitutional right. In Robinson v United Kingdom (App. No. 20858/92, 1993) the European Commission of Human Rights decided that a complaint that s. 2(2) infringed Article 6(2) was manifestly ill-founded: this reflected its previous decision regarding insanity in the case of H v United Kingdom (App. No. 15023/89, 1990) . In the Commission's opinion, the provision was justified pursuant to Salabiaku v France.
Thus, in the present case, Lord Hughes stated that, if a reverse burden provision has been 'created, plainly deliberately, by Parliament that, in a democratic society, is not a factor without significance ' (at [26] ). His Lordship stated (at [26] ) that, in the Ali and Jordan appeals, the court did not fall into the error identified by Lord Bingham in Sheldrake v DPP ; Attorney General 's Reference (No. 4 of 2002) , of giving too much weight to s. 2(2), and too little weight to the presumption of innocence, and the obligation imposed on the court by s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Sheldrake at [31] ).
Thirdly, the court recognised a distinction between a reverse burden provision relating to a component of the offence (such as the existence of intent), compared to one which relates to an exception or recognised excuse for it. According to the court, this distinction is a relevant factor in determining the justification of the reverse burden provision (at *J. Crim. L. 365 [30] No. 195 (2004) ) which recommended that the reverse burden of proof was necessary to the operation of diminished responsibility (at paras 5. 17-5.28 ). This recommendation was enshrined within s. 51B(4) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Subsequently, in Lilburn v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 41, it was held that the reverse burden creates a legal rather than an evidential burden and that, in applying Salabiaku v France, a legal burden was proportionate. The Scottish Law Commission's recommendation was echoed by the English Law Commission, which articulated the view that the burden of proving diminished responsibility should remain with the defendant (Partial Defences to Murder, Law Com. Report No. 290 (2004) para. 5.92 and Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com. Report No. 304 (2006) para. 5.105). Consequently, the amendment to the defence of diminished responsibility, pursuant to s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, does not alter the burden of proving the defence. Parliament has ensured that the legal burden remains on the defendant.
